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Informational Rents and Discretionary Industrial Assistance 
 
Colin Wren 
 
1: Introduction 
 
There have been fundamental changes in the nature of industrial subsidies over the last few 
decades (Schwartz and Clements, 1999).  Not only have they become more narrowly focused on 
small-scale microeconomic interventions designed to improve allocative efficiency (see Wren and 
Storey, 2002), but there has been a shift from automatic to discretionary assistance in an effort to 
improve the performance of these measures.  Automatic assistance is available at pre-determined 
rates to firms, whereas discretionary assistance is allocated on a case-by-case basis at the discretion 
of the policymaker, with the advantage that the assistance contract can be better tailored to the aims 
of the policymaker (Swales, 1997).  In many countries discretionary assistance is now the mainstay 
of industrial support programmes (Holden and Swales, 1995).1 
 
The difficulty with automatic assistance is that under asymmetric information over the 
nature of projects the firms are able to extract an “informational rent,” which reduces the efficiency 
of these schemes (Picard, 2001).  Discretionary assistance has the potential advantage that it gives 
the policymaker the opportunity to collect or verify information about each project, so that the 
terms of the assistance contract can be varied in the light of this information. This means assistance 
may be refused to projects that do not depend on assistance, while for other projects assistance may 
be reduced to the minimum necessary for it to proceed.  It leads to a welfare gain in the form of a 
cost saving to the Exchequer from the reduced informational rents, but there are several factors that 
may reduce the attractiveness of discretionary schemes.  One is the cost or difficulty of obtaining 
information on the nature of projects, and another is the welfare loss of any errors from incorrectly 
identifying the nature of projects.  This might reduce the Exchequer cost saving or could mean that 
some investment projects do not go ahead at all.  Further, discretion may open up the possibility of 
bargaining with firms over the terms of the assistance contract.   
 
Despite the increased use of discretionary assistance, virtually all the research on industrial 
subsidies relates to automatic assistance.  Under this, firms are free to take up any of the contracts 
on offer, and the analyses focus on incentive compatibility constraints (Picard, 2001; Wren, 2002a). 
It means that from a theoretical standpoint the efficiency of discretionary assistance is unexplored,2 
although there are a number of empirical studies.3  The purpose of this paper is to examine the 
existence and efficiency of discretionary assistance relative to automatic assistance.  Each scheme 
is considered in grant form, and two kinds of discretionary assistance scheme are analysed.  The 
first is a ‘Proof of Need’ scheme in which discretion is exercised over the project ‘additionality’, so 
that the government seeks to exclude the projects that do not depend on assistance.  The second is a 
‘Minimum Necessary’ scheme in which the government seeks to reduce the grant to a minimum for 
each project in order to maximise the Exchequer cost saving.  Under asymmetric information the 
government makes errors, but it is supposed that it can commit resources to scrutinise projects, and 
this increases the probability that it correctly allocates the assistance contracts. 
 
The analysis is based on the model developed for automatic assistance in Wren (2002a).  It 
has some similarities with models developed by Laffont and Tirole (1994) and Swales (1995b), but 
it is quite distinct. 4  The government designs assistance contracts to maximise social welfare under 
asymmetric information over a uniform distribution of firms with differing productivities.  Firms 
are free to take up any of the contract on offer under automatic assistance, but under discretionary 
assistance the government allocates a separate contract to each firm, which may be a null contract 
with a zero grant rate.  The paper finds circumstances in which discretionary assistance does not 
exist (in that welfare is higher in the without-subsidy position) and circumstances where automatic 
assistance is more efficient.  However, while discretionary assistance can improve the performance 
of industrial subsidies, for existence the probability of identifying the project ‘additionality’ must 
be sufficiently high, and for efficiency the cost of scrutinising projects must be low.   
 
Section 2 considers the nature of discretionary assistance, and the modelling framework is 
set out in section 3.  Section 4 describes the first-best scheme under full information, including the 
implications of bargaining for the results, and section 5 analyses automatic assistance.  Section 6 
examines the two discretionary schemes, and section 7 discusses the results and concludes. 
 
2: The Nature of Discretionary Assistance 
 
Industrial assistance can be viewed as a principal-agent relationship in which the firm is 
contracted to carry out an investment project by the government in return for financial assistance.  
The parties have different objectives, which can give rise to adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems.  Whereas automatic assistance sets the contract ‘automatically’ for each firm according 
to the conditions in the published eligibility criteria, discretionary assistance gives the government 
the opportunity to collect or verify information about each project, with the advantage that in the 
light of this information the government can exercise ‘discretion’ in setting the grant rate to better 
fulfil its objectives.  This information cannot be determined from the published eligibility criteria 
alone, as there is an incentive for a firm to misrepresent its type. 
 
There are several features of discretionary assistance (see Swales 1995a).  First, discretion 
is not necessary under full information, as there is no new information for the government to learn 
about a project that cannot be written into the eligibility criteria, so that the distinction between 
discretionary and automatic assistance only exists in a second-best position.  Second, the difference 
between automatic and discretionary assistance has nothing to do with whether the grant rate is 
varied, as an automatic scheme could involve a variable grant rate, while a discretionary scheme 
could involve a single grant rate that is refused to some firms (eg. under a ‘Proof of Need’ scheme).  
Finally, bargaining over the grant rate will tend to occur where the bargaining strength of the firm 
is greatest, eg. the investment scale is large and / or the number of projects is small.  Bargaining is 
associated with discretionary assistance, and this is because these schemes operate where the firms 
have the greatest bargaining power, but it could occur with automatic assistance. 
 
In practice, discretion may be exercised in many ways, depending both on the objectives of 
the government and on the way in which the assistance contract is varied.  The UK experience 
suggests that discretion may be used as an attempt to mitigate adverse selection or moral hazard.5   
In this paper, discretion is considered in relation to adverse selection, which is the context in which 
discretionary assistance has been extended to many areas of industrial support.  Under the ‘Proof of 
Need’ scheme the government’s problem is to identify the project ‘additionality’, and hence the 
prospective counter-factual position, which depends on the project characteristics.  The ‘Minimum 
Necessary’ scheme seeks to offer assistance as the minimum necessary for a project to proceed, and 
this is analogous to price discrimination, with the government seeking to determine the assistance 
contract for each project according to the firm’s willingness to invest. 
 
3: The Modelling Framework 
 
 The framework is based on a simplified version of the model developed in Wren (2002a). 
This is a highly stylised model, which was used to analyse automatic assistance, but it draws out 
the main features with great analytical power.  The economy consists of a finite number n of profit-
maximising firms, indexed by i, and a government that offers assistance contracts to firms in order 
to maximise social welfare.  A firm’s willingness to invest is determined by its productivity, and 
these are uniformly distributed across projects. The government has second-order knowledge of the 
productivities under asymmetric information, and it moves first in offering assistance contracts in 
grant form at a rate of gi (0 ≤ gi ≤ 1).  The assistance is available towards investment (see Fuest and 
Huber, 2000), and it could be provided on an automatic or a discretionary basis.  The nature of the 
firm and the government problems are now considered. 
 
 3.1 The Firms 
 
Each firm has a single investment project Ii of the same fixed scale I > 0, so that the terms 
‘project’ and ‘firm’ are used interchangeably.  Only profitable projects are implemented, and these 
utilise labour E in a fixed proportion γ > 0.  Project output qi is a linear function of the inputs 
 
 qi  =  αi I  +  β E (1) 
 
 where αi denotes the firm productivity and β > 0 is the productivity of labour.  The linear 
production form has little significance given the assumption of a constant investment scale, while 
for simplicity labour is supplied at a constant productivity, which again has little significance as 
there are fixed factor proportions.  The productivities or types αi are uniformly distributed across 
firms with a lower limit 0 and an upper limit of α, so that there are m = n / α firms of each type.   
 
The firms finance their investment from assistance of amount Ai and from private funds Fi 
(Ai, Fi ≥ 0).  The first of these is determined once the grant rate gi is known, while it is assumed that 
the private funds are available at an opportunity cost of r (1 ≤ r < α).  This may be thought of as the 
present value cost of bank loans.  It is equal to unity when risk-neutral banks operate in competitive 
markets.  The cost of private funds could potentially indicate a firm’s type, but the parameterisation 
of r means that this signal is not available, while its relaxation is outside the paper’s scope.  Labour 
is paid out of revenue at a competitive market wage w that is equal to its marginal productivity β. 
 
Given the above, a firm in receipt of assistance at a grant rate of gi has profits πi of 
 
 πi  =  (αi Ii  +  β E) – r Fi – w E (2) 
 
 where  Ii = Fi + Ai and Ai = gi Ii (3a, 3b) 
 
The price of capital goods is set to unity and the output price is taken as numeraire.  When 
the constraints in (3) are substituted into the objective function, profits simplify to  
 
 πi  =  {αi - (1 - gi) r} Ii (4) 
 
 The firms that invest are those earning non-negative profits, so that Ii = I when αi ≥ (1 - gi) r 
(ie. πi ≥ 0), but Ii = 0 when αi < (1 - gi) r.  Hence, investment depends on the firm’s productivity αi 
relative to the terms on which the firm has access to public and private funds, ie. gi and r. 
 
 3.2 The Government 
 
 The government is the only source of industrial subsidy.  For each assistance scheme it sets 
the contracts to maximise social welfare W above the level that would occur in the without-subsidy 
position where no assistance is on offer, ie. ∆W.  The welfare function W is specified to capture the 
main features of the problem (see Layard, 1979), and it is summed over the n firms as follows 
 
 W   =   Σi γ Ii  +  Σi µ πi  -  Σi λ Ai  -  Σi Ci (5) 
 
 The primary benefit arises from investment.  In this case it is employment E = γ I, but under 
alternative interpretations γ could capture other benefits from the investment, so that for generality 
γ is referred to as the social value of investment, and the model has wide application.6  The second 
right-hand side term is the social value of the private producer surplus, ie. firm profits.  These have 
a weight of µ ≥ 0, which includes any flow-backs to the Exchequer from profits taxes.  The third 
term is the social cost of assistance, which measures the alternative uses to which the assistance 
may be put.  It is assumed that the scheme is funded from distortionary taxes at a shadow cost of λ 
> 1.   The final right-hand side term is the scrutiny costs that are incurred by the government in 
attempting to learn a firm’s type under discretionary assistance, on which more is said below.  For 
simplicity, the firm compliance costs and other administration costs are set to zero. 
 
 The welfare function captures the direct effects only, but the indirect effects can potentially 
be parameterised in (5), while consumers pay a price for output equal to their marginal valuation.  
Further details are given in Wren (2002a).  There are two constraints on the parameters 
 
 λ  >  µ r  and  λ  >  γ (6a, 6b) 
 
 The first of these ensures that ‘deadweight spending’ is welfare reducing.  It means that the 
government never transfers funds to a firm without some increase in investment.  A transfer of 
resources Ai has a value to the firm of r Ai and a social value of µ r Ai, but there is a resource cost 
of λ Ai.   Hence, the welfare change is - (λ - µ r) A, which by (6a) is negative.  If (6a) does not hold 
then there is no benefit from discretionary assistance and welfare is higher under an automatic 
scheme.  The assumption is reasonable, as the funds for assistance could be raised by taxing firms’ 
profits, which have a resource cost of µ r, but in addition they incur an excess burden, so that λ > µ 
r.  Throughout, deadweight spending is denoted by η ≡ λ - µ r > 0. 
 
 The second constraint means that under full information the government does not assist the 
whole economy of firms, so that the marginal grant rate is set to a value that is strictly less than 
unity. 7  It can be seen by noting that under full information πi = Ci = 0 in (5) for the marginal firm.  
At the margin, W = 0, so that γ I - λ gi I = 0, which gives a marginal grant rate of γ / λ < 1 by (6b). 
 
 3.3 The Equilibrium 
 
 An assistance scheme consists of contracts that are all either discretionary or automatic in 
nature.  The government moves first in offering contracts that firms take up to maximise profits. 
Under automatic assistance a firm may take up any of the contracts that are on offer, but under 
discretionary assistance each firm is allocated a separate contract, which when the firm is refused 
assistance is a null contract with a zero grant rate.  The government maximises social welfare W, 
where the equilibrium is when the firms take up contracts such that the welfare change ∆W from 
the without-subsidy position where no assistance contracts are on offer is non-negative (ie. ∆W ≥ 
0).  A scheme is said to have ‘failed’ if an equilibrium does not exist (ie. ∆W < 0). 
 
The outcome under full information is considered in the next section, which illustrates the 
general approach.  The distinction between discretionary and automatic assistance does not exist in 
this position, but the first-best scheme is considered without and with bargaining.  The former case 
is a special case of the latter, in which the firms have zero bargaining strength.  A firm’s bargaining 
strength is likely to be greater if the number of projects n is small or the investment scale I is large, 
but both of these are exogenous to the analysis.   
 
The interest and focus of the paper is in the second-best position, where the government is 
uninformed about the firm productivities and hence the willingness to invest.  As mentioned above, 
two kinds of discretionary scheme are considered, for which automatic assistance is the benchmark 
scheme.  This analysis is conducted under several simplifying assumptions.  The first is that there 
is no signalling on the part of firms, either intentionally or otherwise, so that the firm productivity 
is the only distinguishing characteristic of projects.8  The second assumption is that projects can be 
costlessly monitored and a ‘claw-back’ condition is in place, so that there is no moral hazard.  The 
final assumption is that in determining the welfare for each scheme there is no bargaining over the 
grant rate.  Bargaining is usually associated with discretionary assistance, but in principle it could 
occur with an automatic scheme even though the formal grant rate is determined automatically by 
the published eligibility criteria.  This issue is considered further below. 
 
4: The First-Best Scheme 
 
 Under full information the government observes the firm productivities, and it sets the grant 
rate for each project according to its willingness to invest.  When there is no bargaining, it is able to 
extract the full producer surplus as a welfare gain.  It is analogous to first-degree or perfect price 
discrimination.  By (4) with πi = 0 the grant rate offered to each firm i is 
 
 gi  =  (r - αi) / r (7) 
 
 To determine the welfare for the scheme it is necessary to optimally determine the highest 
grant rate gm paid to the marginal projects, where 0 < gi ≤ gm.  Figure 1 shows that the firms with 
productivities in the range r ≤ αi ≤ α are ‘non-additional’ projects.  These go ahead in the absence 
of assistance and they are offered a grant rate of zero.  Other projects are ‘additional’, in that they 
require public support to make them viable.  There are two sub-groups.  The first are ‘target’ firms 
(gm ≤ αi < r), which are offered assistance in the first-best position, and the second are ‘non-target’ 
firms (0 ≤ αi < gm), which are refused assistance.  The participation constraint for an additional 
project is πi ≥ 0, where profits are given by (4), while a non-additional project will take up any 
offered assistance contract, as it does not change its behaviour and it is a pure windfall gain. 
 
 To derive the welfare expression, it can be noted that only the target firms receive support, 
so that the number of subsidised projects is m {r - (1 - gm)r}.  This equals r gm m and investment is 
Σi Ii = r gm m I.  By (7) the grant rate increases linearly from 0 to gm, so that the average grant rate 
is gm / 2 and total assistance is Σi Ai = (r gm m I) gm / 2.  Profits and the scrutiny costs are zero, ie. Σi 
πi = Σi Ci = 0. The non-additional projects are implemented exactly as in the without-subsidy 
position, and do not receive assistance, so that the welfare change for the first-best scheme ∆WF is  
 
 ∆WF = r gm m I [γ  -  λ gm / 2] (8) 
 
 The term in front of the square brackets is the volume of investment, while the term inside 
the brackets is the average welfare effect per unit of investment.  Both of these terms depend on the 
marginal grant rate.  This can be found by partially differentiating (8) with respect to gm and setting 
this equal to zero for a maximum.  This gives gm* = γ / λ < 1 by (6b).  Further, partial substitution 
of this into (8) gives the maximised change in welfare as 
 
 ∆WF* = r gm* m I [γ / 2] (9) 
 
It is positive, so that an equilibrium in assistance exists in the first-best position.  Welfare 
increases with r, m, I and γ, but it decreases with λ, and each of these is plausible. 
 
 4.1 Bargaining 
 
 Where the number of projects is small or the investment scale is large the firm has some 
bargaining strength and it may be able to secure a higher grant rate in order to increase profits. This 
occurs, even though the government can observe the relevant firm characteristics.  In this case the 
government enters into negotiation with the firm, and the grant rate is determined as a co-operative 
bargaining agreement.  Let b denote the government bargaining power (0 ≤ b ≤ 1), and suppose the 
contracts are negotiated independently across projects, then the bargained grant rate gib for firm i is 
found by maximising the Nash bargain Vi as follows 
 
 Vi  =  (Wi - Wi0)b (πi - πi0)1 – b (10) 
 
 where Wi0 and πi0 are the disagreement positions.  This holds for the additional firms only, 
as the non-additional projects are offered a zero grant rate, so that there is nothing to bargain over.  
When agreement is not reached the additional firms undertake no investment, so that Wi0 = πi0 = 0.  
Wi and πi are given by (5) and (4), and substituting these into (10) gives 
 
 Vi  =  {(γ + µ (αi - (1 - gib) r) - λ gib) I}b {(αi - (1 - gib) r) I}1 – b (11) 
 
Differentiating this with respect to gib the optimal bargained grant rate for firm i is 
 
 gib*  =  {(1 - b) r γ +  (r - αi) (b λ - µ r)}  /  η r (12) 
 
For the bargained contract to be offered the contribution to welfare must be non-negative, 
ie. Wi ≥ 0, and profits must be non-negative for a firm to take it up, ie. πi ≥ 0.  It is shown below 
that the first of these is satisfied, while substituting (12) into (4) gives πi ≥ 0 when 
 
 γ / λ  ≥  (r - αi) / r  (13) 
 
Proposition 1: Bargaining does not affect the marginal grant rate under full information, and the 
volume of investment is unchanged. 
 
Proof: The marginal productivity under bargaining is when (13) holds with equality, which gives 
αmb = r (λ - γ) / λ.  Substituting this into (12) the marginal grant rate is gmb* = γ / λ, which is the 
same as before, ie. gm* = gmb*.  The marginal productivity αmb is independent of the bargaining 
strength b, and hence the same as in the first-best position, which is b = 1 in (11).  This can be seen 
by substituting gm* = γ / λ into (7), which gives αm = r (λ - γ) / λ, so that αm = αmb.  It follows that 
the same number of projects is implemented and that investment is unchanged.   QED 
 
 The intuition behind the result is straightforward.  The non-target projects continue to be 
refused assistance under bargaining, as like before, the grant rate necessary to make these profitable 
means there is no welfare gain.  However, all the target firms receive assistance, since the intra-
marginal projects generate a positive welfare return, and the firms are able to bargain some of this 
away in return for greater profits.  Since each contract is negotiated independently it is not in the 
firm’s interest to bargain for too much profit, such that Wi < 0, as the contract will not be offered.  
It ensures that a contract is offered to each target firm. 
 
 The marginal grant rate is independent of b, as these projects generate a zero welfare gain, 
but the intra-marginal projects it can be shown ∂gib* / ∂b < 0, so that these firms get a higher grant 
rate as their bargaining power increases.  By (12) when they have no bargaining strength (ie. b = 1) 
they receive gib* = (r - αi) / r, which is (7), but when they have maximum bargaining strength (ie. b 
= 0) they get gib* = {γ - (r - αi) µ} / η.  This reaches a maximum of γ / λ < 1 for the marginal 
project, so that 0 ≤ gib* < 1.  Substituting gib* into (4) with b = 0 gives πi* = {γ r - λ (r - αi)} / η, 
and putting this into the expression for welfare gives Wi = 0.  Thus, when the firm has maximum 
bargaining strength it is able to fully appropriate the welfare gain as profit.  
 
 To obtain an expression for welfare it is assumed that the bargaining power b is invariant 
across firms.  This is reasonable as each firm implements the same investment scale.9  Let ∆WB* be 
the change in welfare for the optimal first-best bargained discretionary scheme. 
 
Proposition 2:  Under full information, ∆WB*  = b ∆WF*, so that bargaining reduces social welfare 
in direct proportion to the bargaining strength of the firm. 
 
Proof: By Proposition 1 bargaining does not affect the marginal grant rate, so that total investment 
is Σi Ii = r gm* m I, where gm* = γ / λ.   To find the total firm profits, (4) is integrated across the 
target firms from αmb = r (λ - γ) / λ to αi = r, where the grant rate is given by (12), to give 
 
 Σi πi = r gm* m I [(1 - b) r γ / 2 η] (14) 
 
Likewise, the total assistance can be found by integrating m I gib* across the same range of 
productivities, where gib* is given by (12), to give 
 
 Σi Ai = r gm* m I [(2 - b - µ r / λ) γ / 2 η] (15) 
 
 Substituting these into (5) with Σi Ci = 0, and after rearrangement, the change in welfare for 
the optimal first-best bargained discretionary scheme ∆WB* is 
 
 ∆WB* = b r gm* m I [γ / 2] (16) 
 
 Comparison with (9) shows ∆WB*  = b ∆WF*.   QED 
 
When the firms have no bargaining power, ∆WB* = ∆WF*, but when they have maximum 
bargaining strength then ∆WB* = 0, so that the firms appropriate the welfare gain. 
 
5: Automatic Assistance 
 
Automatic assistance is when the firms are free to take-up any contract on offer according 
to the published eligibility criteria.  The firm productivities are not observed under asymmetric 
information, so that the government sets the contracts based only on second-order knowledge of the 
overall distribution.  A firm will take up assistance at the highest offered rate, and since there is no 
way of generating a separating equilibrium, the optimal scheme has a single pooling grant rate. The 
automatic assistance scheme is described more fully in Wren (2002a).  Letting ga denote the grant 
rate, the expression for the change in welfare ∆WA can be derived as 
 
 ∆WA  =  r ga m I [γ  -  ga (λ + η) / 2]  -  (α - r) m I [ga η] (17) 
 
 The first right-hand side term is the welfare gain from the additional projects.  By (4) the 
marginal productivity is αi = (1 - ga) r, so that there are r m ga of these projects.  The average social 
value of investment is γ and the average social value of profits is µ r ga / 2, while the average cost 
of assistance is λ ga.  The second right-hand side term is the welfare loss from the non-additional 
projects, which now cannot be excluded from assistance.  There are (α - r) m of these projects that 
each receive assistance of Ai = ga I, which is ‘deadweight spending’ and has a weight of η. 
 
 Differentiating (17) with respect to ga the optimal grant rate is 
 
 ga*  =  (γ - χ) / (λ + η)  where χ ≡ η (α - r) / r > 0 (18a, 18b) 
 
 To ensure ga* ≤ 1 then γ ≤ λ + α η / r, which is satisfied by (6).  Partial substitution of (18a) 
into (17) gives the maximised welfare as 
 
 ∆WA*  =  r ga* m I [γ - χ] / 2 (19) 
 
An equilibrium in automatic assistance exists only if γ ≥ χ, in which case ga* ≥ 0 and ∆WA* 
≥ 0.  This means r γ ≥ (α - r) η, so that the benefit from giving assistance to the additional projects, 
ie. r γ m ga I, is not less than the deadweight spending from giving assistance to the non-additional 
projects, ie. (α - r) η m ga I.  By (9), there is a welfare loss relative to the first-best scheme.   
 
6: Discretionary Assistance 
 
 Deadweight spending may occur in both ‘non-additional’ and ‘additional’ projects, giving 
rise to two kinds of discretionary assistance scheme.  The first is a ‘Proof of Need’ scheme in 
which the government seeks to exclude the non-additional projects.  The second is a ‘Minimum 
Necessary’ scheme in which the government seeks to reduce the grant to the minimum necessary 
for all projects.  In the first scheme the government seeks information on the counter-factual 
position, ie. would the project go ahead without assistance or not, while in the second scheme it 
seeks information on the firm’s productivity, which also it gives information on the counter-factual 
position.   The advantage of the ‘Proof of Need’ scheme is that it has less exacting requirements, so 
that the scrutiny costs are lower, but the disadvantage is that the firm’s willingness to invest is not 
observed, so that a single grant rate must be offered.   
 
Discretionary assistance means that the government can scrutinise projects by committing 
resources or effort, which increases the probability that it correctly identifies the true nature of a 
project (ie. the counter-factual position or the productivity).  It is only after all the contracts have 
been allocated that the government might learn which of the contracts has been allocated correctly, 
so that it acts in the belief that it knows the project’s nature, but it may make errors. These either 
result in a windfall gain to the firm or to no investment at all.  The scrutiny is costly, but it helps 
determine the welfare-maximising grant rate, which in the absence of bargaining is the same as the 
offered grant rate.  For simplicity, the government does not announce the maximum grant rate, so 
that firms are not discouraged from applying. 10  This includes those firms whose productivity is so 
low that they would turn down the assistance if offered. 
 
6.1 The ‘Proof of Need’ Scheme 
 
Under the ‘Proof of Need’ scheme the government seeks information on the prospective 
counter-factual position to learn if in the absence of assistance a project will go ahead or not.  The 
purpose of this is to withhold assistance from non-additional projects, while supporting only those 
projects that are additional.  It differs from the automatic scheme where the non-additional projects 
cannot be excluded at all.  Since it does not observe the firm productivities (but only if αi is greater 
or less than r), the assistance is offered at a single grant rate gs to any project that it believes to be 
additional, but only for a marginal project will this be the minimum necessary for it to proceed.   If 
the government believes a project is non-additional it offers a null contract.   
 
The government has second-order knowledge of the overall distribution of productivities, 
but in the absence of scrutiny it has no information on any given project at all. In the population as 
a whole the ratio of additional to non-additional projects is r / α, and in the absence of scrutiny it is 
assumed that with a probability r / α the government believes that the project is additional and it 
offers gs, but with a probability (α - r) / α it believes that it is non-additional and it offers a null 
contract.  This means it makes two types of error 
 
Type I: the government wrongly refuses a grant to an additional project 
Type II: the government wrongly assists a non-additional project. 
 
The government scrutinises a project by committing effort e (e ≥ 0), and it is supposed that 
it learns the ‘Proof of Need’ with a probability p = p(e), where 0 ≤ p(e) ≤ 1 and p’(e) > 0.  The cost 
to the government of this scrutiny is C = C(e), where C(0) = 0 and C’(e) ≥ 0.  Both p(e) and C(e) 
are the same across projects, and are known by the government.  The government fails to correctly 
identify the ‘Proof of Need’ with probability 1 - p, so that it makes a Type I error with a probability 
(1 - p) (α - r) / α and a Type II error with a probability (1 - p) r / α, where (1 - p) (α - r) / α + (1 - 
p) r / α = 1 - p.  These errors may be reduced by greater scrutiny, but it may not be optimal to avoid 
them altogether, as scrutiny is costly.  The expression for welfare ∆WS is 
 
 ∆WS  =  p r gs m I [γ  -  gs (λ + η) / 2]   
 
 +  (1 - p) (r / α) {r gs m I [γ  -  gs (λ + η) / 2)]  -  (α - r) m I [gs η]} -  α m I C (20a) 
 
The first right-hand side term is the welfare when the government learns the counter-factual 
position or ‘Proof of Need’ with a probability p. An additional project receives assistance at a grant 
rate of gs and makes non-zero profits at an average rate of gs / 2, while a non-additional project is 
offered a null contract.  The second term is the welfare when the government does not learn the 
‘Proof of Need’.  In this case, an additional project is offered gs with a probability (1 - p) (r / α), 
but a non-additional project is also incorrectly offered gs with the same probability, which is a 
windfall gain to the firm.  The final term is the cost of scrutinising projects. 
 
An additional project is assisted with a total probability of p + (1 - p) (r / α), which equals 
{r + p (α - r)} /α.   It is easier to work with this rather than p, so let P ≡ {r + p (α - r)} / α, where 
∂P / ∂p = (α - r) /α > 0.  When p = 0 then P = r / α and when p = 1 then P =1, so that r / α ≤ P ≤ 1.  
Also, since 1 - P = (1 - p) (α - r) /α, then (20a) can be written more simply as 
 
 ∆WS  =  P r gs m I [γ  -  gs (λ + η) / 2)]  -  (1 - P) r m I [gs η]  -  α m I C (20b) 
 
Differentiating this with respect to gs gives 
 
 gs  =  {P γ - (1 - P) η} / (λ + η) P (21) 
 
 It is straightforward to show gs < gm*, so that investment is always lower than in the first-
best position, and comparison with that for the automatic scheme in (18a) tells us that gs > ga*, but 
investment may be no greater because of the Type I errors.  It can be shown that gs ≤ 1 when P (γ - 
λ) ≤ η, and setting P = 1 a sufficient condition for this is γ ≤ λ + η, which is satisfied by (6). 
 
Proposition 3: The ‘Proof of Need’ scheme fails to exist when P < η / (η + γ). 
 
Proof: By (21), gs ≥ 0 if and only if P γ - (1 - P) η ≥ 0, which rearranges to P ≥ η / (η + γ). QED 
 
 The probability of learning the ‘Proof of Need’ must be sufficiently large for a non-negative 
grant rate to be offered, and hence for the scheme to exist.  Since P ≡ {r + p (α - r)} / α, this might 
happen with or without scrutiny (ie. p > 0 or p = 0 respectively).  When P < η / (η + γ) the scheme 
does not exist because the cost of the deadweight spending exceeds the social value of investment, 
which is independent of any scrutiny costs.11    The critical value η / (η + γ) is negatively related to 
γ and positively related to η, so that the greater is the welfare loss from deadweight spending η the 
greater must be the probability that the grants are correctly allocated.  Of course, as η tends to zero 
then the condition is always satisfied. 
 
Partial substitution of (21) into (20b) the welfare for the scheme is 
 
 ∆WS  =  WSB - WSC (22) 
 
 where  WSB = r gs m I [P γ - (1 - P) η] / 2  and WSC = α m I C  
  
 WSB is the benefit function and WSC is the scrutiny cost.  The benefit depends on p = p(e) 
while the cost function depends on C = C(e).  In what follows it is supposed that these functions are 
linear in effort, so that p(e) = e and C(e) = c e, where 0 ≤ e ≤ 1 and c > 0.  These lead to a corner 
solution in effort, but they are the simplest functional forms to work with.  As we see, other forms 
can generate an interior solution, but they prove intractable. 
 
 Differentiating WSB in (22) with respect to P gives 
 
 ∂WSB / ∂P  =  r m I [(η + γ)2 - (η  / P)2] / 2 (λ + η) (23) 
 
 By Proposition 3, gs > 0 when P > η / (η + γ), and in this range it can be shown that ∂WSB / 
∂P > 0 and ∂2WSB / ∂P2 > 0, so that WSB is strictly convex in P.  This schedule is sketched in Figure 
2.  Further, since C = c e = c p and P ≡ {r + p (α - r)} / α, then WSC = α m I c (α P - r) / (α - r). 
This is linear in P, and WSC = 0 when P = r / α, which is when effort is zero.   
 
The existence and relative efficiency of the assistance schemes depends on two factors. The 
first is the sign on γ - χ, which determines whether r / α is greater or less than η / (η + γ), and 
hence where the WSC schedule cuts the P-axis relative to the WSB schedule in Figure 2.  The second 
is the average scrutiny cost c in C = c e.  This leads to the following set of results. 
 
Proposition 4: When γ < χ, the automatic assistance scheme does not exist, but the ‘Proof of 
Need’ discretionary scheme exists provided c ≤ ϕ ≡ r γ2 / 2 α (λ + η). 
 
Proof: When γ < χ then ∆WA* < 0 by (19).  Further, γ < χ rearranges to r / α < η / (η + γ), so that 
the WSC schedule cuts the P-axis to the left of the WSB schedule.  Since the WSB schedule is strictly 
convex in P while the WSC schedule is linear, the ‘Proof of Need’ scheme exists only if ∆WS ≥ 0 at 
P = 1 in (22).  Making this substitution gives the result. QED 
 
The interpretation of this result is as follows. When γ < χ the automatic scheme fails 
because the deadweight spending of the non-additional projects is too high relative to the benefit 
derived from the additional projects.  However, the discretionary scheme exists provided effort is 
expended to learn the ‘Proof of Need’ but at a scrutiny cost that is not too high. When c ≤ ϕ, the 
WSC schedule cuts the WSB schedule, but from above, so that welfare is maximised at P = 1.  This is 
when maximum effort is supplied, so that e = p = P = 1. Substituting P = 1 into (22) welfare is 
 
 ∆WSe=1 =  r m I [α / r (ϕ - c)] (24) 
 
so that ∆WSe=1 ≥ 0 when c ≤ ϕ.  It increases with r and γ, but decreases with λ, η, α and c. 
 
Proposition 5: When γ ≥ χ, both the automatic assistance and ‘Proof of Need’ schemes exist, but 
when c > φ ≡ (α - r) {r γ (γ + 2 η) - (α - r) η2} / 2 α2 (λ + η) it is optimal to supply zero effort and 
the discretionary scheme is less efficient than the automatic scheme, where φ ≤ ϕ.12 
 
Proof: When γ ≥ χ then ∆WA* ≥ 0 by (19).  Further, γ ≥ χ rearranges to r / α ≥ η / (η + γ), so that 
the WSC schedule cuts the P-axis to the right of the WSB schedule.  Since the WSB schedule is strictly 
convex, welfare is maximised at either e = 0 or e = 1, so that P = r / α or P = 1.  Substituting P = r / 
α into (22) then welfare is  
 
 ∆WSe=0  =  (r / α) r m I [γ - χ]2 / 2 (λ + η) (25) 
 
By (24) and (25) it can be shown that ∆WSe=0  > ∆WSe=1 when c > φ, so that it is optimal to 
supply no effort and hence not to scrutinise projects. However, comparison of (25) with (19) shows 
that ∆WSe=0 = (r / α) ∆WA*, so that welfare is lower than for the automatic scheme. QED 
 
 When the scrutiny costs are relatively high then no effort is expended, and in this case the 
discretionary scheme is inferior to automatic assistance.  This is because the contracts are allocated 
between the additional and non-additional projects in the same proportion as the automatic scheme, 
but only a fraction of the additional projects receive a non-zero contract and welfare is lower.  It is 
despite the grant rates being the same between the two schemes, as substituting P = r / α into (21) 
gives (18a).  This case is sketched in Figure 2, which shows that welfare is maximised at P = r / α. 
 
Proposition 6: When γ ≥ χ and c ≤ φ, the ‘Proof of Need’ scheme exists, but it is only more 
efficient than the automatic scheme when c < ψ ≡ χ (2 γ - χ) ϕ / γ2, where ψ < φ. 
 
Proof: Both schemes exist by Proposition 5.  Since c ≤ φ, then it is optimal to supply maximum 
effort by Proposition 5 and welfare is given by (24).  Comparison with (19) shows that ∆WSe=1 > 
∆WA* when c < ψ. QED 
 
 In summary, if the number of the non-additional projects is relatively high (γ < χ) then the 
automatic scheme fails to exist, while the ‘Proof of Need’ discretionary scheme exists provided the 
average scrutiny cost is not too high, ie. c ≤ ϕ. When the number of the non-additional projects is 
not high (γ ≥ χ), then it may be optimal not to scrutinise projects at all if the average scrutiny cost 
is relatively high, ie. φ ≤ c ≤ ϕ, in which case the automatic scheme is preferred.  In this latter case, 
scrutiny is worthwhile if c < φ, but automatic assistance is more efficient when ψ ≤ c < φ, while the 
discretionary scheme is more efficient only when c < ψ.  This is more likely the higher is γ, α or λ 
and the smaller is µ or r.  It means that the WSC schedule has a relatively flat slope in Figure 2.  
 
6.2 The ‘Minimum Necessary’ Scheme 
 
 Under the ‘Minimum Necessary’ discretionary scheme the government wishes to set the 
grant rate for each project as the minimum necessary for it to proceed.  It has greater informational 
requirements than the ‘Proof of Need’ scheme, as information on the willingness to invest (ie. the 
absolute value of αi) reveals the ‘additionality’ of each project (αi relative to r), but not conversely.  
The government commits effort to scrutinise a project, and it learns the true productivity with a 
probability of q = q(e), where 0 ≤ q(e) ≤ 1 and q’(e) > 0.  The greater informational requirements 
are now represented by C = C(σ e), where σ > 1, C(0) = 0 and C’(σ e) ≥ 0.  Both q(e) and C(σ e) 
are the same across projects and are known by the government.   
 
The government learns the productivity of a project with a true productivity of αi with a 
probability q.  In this case it offers a grant rate of git = (r - αi) / r to an additional project, so that the 
firm makes zero profit, and a null contract to a non-additional project.  However, with a probability 
1 - q it does not learn the productivity, and in this case it is supposed that the government makes an 
error.  With an equal probability it either over- or under-estimates the firm’s true productivity by a 
constant amount r ε, where ε > 0.  This means it believes a project with a true productivity of αi has 
a productivity of αi ± r ε, so that it commits two types of error13 
  
Type III: the grant rate is lower than the minimum necessary. 
Type IV: the grant rate is higher than the minimum necessary. 
 
 It is assumed that the error is relatively small, so that ε ≤ gmt, where gmt is the highest grant 
rate that is offered to the lowest productivity αmt that is correctly identified by the government.  It 
means that when the government incorrectly identifies a firm as having a productivity of less than 
αmt it offers a grant rate of git = ε, which the firm refuses, so that gmt is the highest grant rate that is 
taken up by firms, and 0 ≤ git ≤ gmt.  Using (27) below, ε ≤ gmt implies ε ≤ γ / (λ + η).14 
 
The Type III error is when the government believes that a project with productivity αi has a 
higher productivity of αi + r ε.  For an additional project it offers a lower grant rate of git = (r - αi) / 
r - ε, which the firm refuses, while for a non-additional project it offers a null contract.  The Type 
IV error is when the government believes that the same project has a lower productivity of αi - r ε, 
and it offers a higher grant rate of git = (r - αi) / r + ε to an additional project, which is deadweight 
spending.  It also commits Type I and II errors, so that it believes that a project with a productivity 
in the range αmt to αmt + r ε has a productivity of less than αmt and it refuses assistance (a Type I 
error), and it believes that a non-additional project with a productivity in the range r to r + r ε is 
additional, and it offers a non-zero contract (a Type II error).  Welfare ∆WT is therefore: 
 
 ∆WT  =  q r gmt m I [γ  -  λ gmt / 2]   +  {(1 - q) / 2} r gmt m I [γ  -  λ gmt / 2 - η ε] 
 
 -  {(1 - q) / 2} r ε m I [γ  +  η ε / 2]  -  α m I C (26a) 
 
 The first right-hand side term is the welfare when the government correctly identifies the 
productivity with a probability of q.  There are r gmt m additional projects, and on average they 
receive a grant at a rate of gmt / 2.  The second term is the welfare for the additional projects when 
the government offers a higher grant rate of git = (r - αi) / r + ε with a probability of (1 - q) / 2, but 
in the absence of any Type I or II errors.  The average benefit is smaller by η ε because of the 
deadweight spending from the higher grant rate.  The third right-hand side term captures the Type I 
and II errors.15  The final term is the scrutiny cost. 
 
 In the absence of Type I and II errors, the probability that an additional project is assisted is 
(1 + q) / 2, and it is easier to work with Q ≡ (1 + q) / 2.  When q = 0 then Q = 1 / 2 and when q = 1 
then Q = 1, so that 1 / 2 ≤ Q ≤ 1.  Since (1 - q) / 2 is equal to 1 - Q, (26a) can be rewritten as 
 
∆WT  =  Q r gmt m I [γ - λ gmt / 2]  -  (1 - Q) r ε m I [γ + η (gmt + ε / 2) ]  -  α m I C (26b) 
 
 and differentiating this with respect to gmt the marginal grant rate is 
 
 gmt  =  {Q γ - (1 - Q) η ε} / λ Q (27) 
 
 If Q = 1 the government always correctly identifies the true productivity, and the grant rate 
is the same as in the first-best position, ie. gmt = γ / λ.  In this case, investment is also the same as in 
the first-best position, but welfare is lower because of the scrutiny costs, ie. ∆WT = ∆WF - α m I C.  
Clearly, gmt < 1 when Q (γ - λ) - (1 - Q) η ε < 0, and setting Q = 1 a sufficient condition for this is γ 
< λ, which is satisfied by (6b). Also, gs > 0 when Q > η ε / (η ε + γ), which is similar to Proposition 
3.  It means that the probability of assisting an additional project must be sufficiently large.  In this 
case it is because of the deadweight spending that arises from an error, ie. η ε.16 
 
Partial substitution of (27) into (26b) the welfare for the scheme is 
 
 ∆WT  =  WTB - WTC (28) 
 
 where WTB = r gmt m I [Q γ - (1 - Q) η ε] / 2 - (1 - Q) r ε m I [γ + η ε / 2]  and WTC = α m I C.   
 
and differentiating the benefit function gives 
 
 ∂WTB / ∂Q  =  r m I [(η ε + γ)2 - (η ε / Q)2] / 2 λ  + r ε m I [γ + η ε / 2] (29) 
 
 By the above, gmt > 0 when Q > η ε / (η ε + γ), and in this range it can be shown that ∂WTB / 
∂Q > 0, but also that ∂2WTB / ∂Q2 > 0.  Further, when Q = η ε / (η ε + γ), then WTB < 0.  Again, in 
what follows it is supposed that the relevant functions are linear in effort e, so that q = q(e) = e and 
C = C(σ e) = c σ e, where 0 ≤ e ≤ 1 and c > 0.  Since q = e and Q ≡ (1 + q) / 2, the cost function is 
WTC = α m I c σ (2 Q - 1).  This is linear in Q and it cuts the Q-axis at Q = 1 / 2, where e = 0.  The 
benefit and cost functions are sketched in Figure 3. 
 
Again, a key issue is where the WTC schedule cuts the Q-axis relative to the WTB schedule.  
The benefit function WTB is negatively related to ε, and when Q = 1 / 2 it can be shown that WTB > 
(≤) 0 when ε2 η (η - λ) - 2 γ ε (η + λ) + γ2 > (≤) 0, which is a quadratic in the error term.  This has 
no simple solution, but as an approximation it can be shown that the WTC schedule cuts the Q-axis 
to the left of the WTB schedule if and only if ε > ≈ γ / 2 (η + λ).17  The results relative to the 
automatic scheme follow in a similar way to before, so that the discussion focuses on the efficiency 
of the ‘Minimum Necessary’ scheme relative to the ‘Proof of Need’ scheme. 
 
Proposition 7: When ε > ≈ γ / 2 (η + λ), the ‘Minimum Necessary’ discretionary assistance exists 
when c σ < ϕ (λ + η) / λ, but it is only more efficient than the ‘Proof of Need’ scheme when ϕ η /  
λ > c (σ - 1), where ϕ is defined in Proposition 4. 
 
Proof: When ε > ≈ γ / 2 (η + λ), the WTC schedule cuts the Q-axis to the left of the WTB schedule, 
and the only way the ‘Minimum Necessary’ scheme can exist is if ∆WT > 0 at Q = 1 (see Figure 3).  
Making this substitution in (28) gives the maximised welfare as 
 
 ∆WTe=1  = r m I [α / r {ϕ (λ + η) / λ  -  c σ}] (30) 
 
 It is positive when c σ < ϕ (λ + η) / λ.  By (24), welfare is greater than for the ‘Proof of 
Need’ scheme when ϕ (λ + η) / λ - σ c > ϕ - c, which rearranges to give the result. QED 
 
 It means that when the error ε is relatively large, the ‘Minimum Necessary’ scheme exists 
only if the government is prepared to commit effort to learn the productivities, but the scrutiny cost 
must not be too great.  It is sketched in Figure 3.  The scheme is more efficient than the ‘Proof of 
Need’ scheme only if ϕ η / λ > c (σ - 1), which is more likely to hold the greater is r, γ and η and 
the smaller is α, λ, σ and c.  These indicate the relative advantage of the ‘Minimum Necessary’ 
scheme. If the welfare effect of deadweight spending η is large, for example, the scheme is 
preferred as it is optimal to vary the grant rate in an attempt to allocate the assistance contracts as 
the minimum necessary.  This is provided that extra scrutiny cost σ of the greater informational 
requirements of the ‘Minimum Necessary’ scheme is not too great.  Indeed, when the scrutiny costs 
of the schemes are the same, ie. σ tends to unity, then it can be seen that the ‘Minimum Necessary’ 
scheme is always preferred, even though the error is relatively large. 
 
 Finally, when the error is relatively small, ie. ε ≤ ≈ γ / 2 (η + λ), the WTC schedule cuts the 
Q-axis on or to the right of the WTB schedule, and the ‘Minimum Necessary’ scheme always exists. 
To save on space the conditions are not derived, but the reasoning is similar to Propositions 5 and 
6.  Broadly, when the scrutiny cost is high, it may be optimal not to scrutinise projects at all, and in 
this case welfare is given by (28) with Q = 1 / 2.  However, when the scrutiny cost is relatively low 
it is optimal to scrutinise projects, and the condition for efficiency of the ‘Minimum Necessary’ 
scheme relative to the ‘Proof of Need’ scheme is the same as in Proposition 7. 
 
7: Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
 
Before concluding, it is worth briefly reviewing some of the key features and assumptions 
of the analysis of the two discretionary schemes.  One important feature of both models is that the 
benefit function is zero over some initial range but then it has a strictly convex form.  The first of 
these indicates that the probability with which the government correctly allocates the contracts to 
firms must exceed some threshold.  This might be through the scrutiny of projects or by chance, but 
the critical probability is smaller the greater is the welfare consequences of deadweight spending.  
The second feature of the benefit function is that over the rest of its range it is strictly convex.  This 
is because an increase in the probability of correctly allocating contracts between firm types has a 
dual effect: not only does it increase the investment level, but it increases the net benefit per unit of 
investment, so that the benefit increases at an increasing rate. 
 
The analysis is conducted under the assumptions that the probability and scrutiny functions 
are linear in effort, which given the strictly convex benefit function, generates a corner solution in 
effort.  To generate an interior solution in effort there are two possibilities.  Since the models have 
a similar structure, these are considered in the case of the ‘Proof of Need’ scheme.  One possibility 
is that C = C(e) is strictly convex in effort, but even for the simplest quadratic form, the optimal 
value of P results from a cubic equation, which is difficult to solve.  The other possibility is that p 
= p(e) is strictly concave in effort, so that the benefit function WSB is also concave in effort.  It can 
be shown that this requires that the degree of concavity satisfies18 
 
 - (∂2p / ∂e2) e / (∂p / ∂e)  >  {(∂P / ∂e) e / P} {2 η2 / (P2 (η + γ)2 - η2)} (31) 
 
 where P ≡ {r + p (α - r)} / α.  The left hand-side is the elasticity of ∂p / ∂e with respect to e, 
where ∂p / ∂e > 0 and ∂2p / ∂e2 < 0, so that the proportionate reduction in ∂p / ∂e as effort increases 
must exceed the right-hand side of (31), which increases with η and α and decreases with γ and r.  
To interpret this, it can be noted that the greater is the welfare loss from deadweight spending η, 
the greater is the benefit from scrutiny.  In this case, to ensure that the benefit function WSB remains 
concave the elasticity must increase as η increases.  As η tends to zero the right-hand side of (31) is 
zero, and any concave function for p(e) will do.  However, even simple concave forms for p(e) will 
not satisfy (31), which points to the great difficulty of solving the model explicitly for an interior 
solution for effort.  Nevertheless, it is believed that the results that have been derived for the linear 
probability and scrutiny functions indicate the general nature of the solution, and that the thrust of 
the results will carry over to more complex functional forms.19 
 
A second feature of the analysis of discretionary assistance is that there is no bargaining 
over the grant rate.  Bargaining is likely to occur where the investment scale is large and / or the 
number of projects is small, as this increases the bargaining strength of the firm, but it applies to 
both discretionary and automatic assistance schemes.  Discretionary assistance is often associated 
with bargaining, as it affords the flexibility of a negotiable grant rate, so that it tends to operate in 
the circumstances in which the firms’ bargaining strength is strongest, such as inward investment 
(see Haaparanta, 1996).  However, discretionary assistance can apply in other circumstances, and a 
proper comparison between the schemes should be made under a constant level of firm bargaining 
strength.  The paper assumes that firms have no bargaining power, but if bargaining is allowed it 
should apply to both discretionary and automatic schemes, in which case the analysis of bargaining 
in the first-best position suggests that the relative direction of the results may be little affected.  In 
particular, not only is investment unaffected by bargaining, but welfare is lower in direct 
proportion to the bargaining strength of the firm.  This suggests that the results will hold more 
generally, but an exception to this might be if a variable grant rate signals the preparedness of the 
government to negotiate and acts as an invitation to the firm to bargain.  This might lessen the 
attractiveness of the ‘Minimum Necessary’ scheme relative to the ‘Proof of Need’ scheme. 
 
In conclusion, the paper offers many interesting insights on discretionary assistance.  While 
previous analyses point to the “informational rents” that firms can extract from industrial subsidy 
schemes under asymmetric information, resulting in deadweight spending, the paper indicates that 
there are two aspects to this, leading to two different kinds of discretionary scheme.  The first is a 
scheme that seeks to exclude the ‘non-additional’ projects that do not depend on assistance, and the 
second is a scheme that also seeks to reduce to a minimum the assistance received by ‘additional’ 
projects.  The paper derives results on the relative efficiency of these two schemes, and it makes 
comparison with automatic assistance, where the firms are free to take up any contract on offer. 
The automatic assistance fails to exist when the deadweight spending on non-additional projects is 
high relative to the benefit from additional projects, in which case discretionary assistance may be 
optimal.  However, discretionary assistance also fails if the probability of identifying the additional 
projects is not sufficiently high, and it is less efficient than automatic assistance when the cost of 
scrutinising projects is not low enough.  In these instances, automatic assistance is preferred.  The 
implication of the paper is that the recent shift towards discretionary assistance may have improved 
the performance of industrial subsidies, but that this depends both on the overall characteristics of 
the firms and the cost of scrutiny.  These are empirical matters, but the current paper helps provide 
a framework in which to investigate these issues. 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. It is difficult to find hard evidence to support this contention, but Grant (1983) detects an early 
shift to selective assistance in several European countries.  Recent surveys of state aids, carried 
out by the OECD (2001) and by the European Union (CEC, 2001), ignore the method of aid 
disbursement, since the interest is in competition policy, so that they collect information on the 
purpose and form of the subsidies (eg. grant, loan, etc).  In the UK there has been a strong 
move to discretionary assistance since the early 1980s, so that virtually all the subsidy is now 
in this form, requiring the firm to demonstrate a ‘proof of need’ (Wren, 1996).  However, as 
elsewhere, there has been a reduction in expenditure on subsidies in recent decades, and these 
issues are considered in Besley and Seabright (1999) and in Collie (2000). 
 
2. A notable exception to this is Swales (1995a, 19995b). 
 
3. In the UK, these are government-funded evaluations of Regional Selective Assistance, the 
main discretionary instrument of regional policy. They find that around a fifth of the supported 
projects do not depend on assistance at all, while the full Exchequer cost saving is achieved in 
only about half the number of projects (Arup Economics and Planning, 2000). This is based on 
interview survey with successful applicants only, so that it is not possible to judge the extent to 
which the cost saving was achieved at the expense of reduced investment from grant offers that 
were too low.  About thirty per cent of the applicants are refused assistance (Wren, 2002b). 
 
4. Laffont and Tirole focus on moral hazard, and when effort is not relevant then the ‘assistance’ 
in their model reduces to a lump sum transfer that is unrelated to investment.  Swales assumes 
that the government commits no errors, but this seems to be a crucial factor in determining the 
relative efficiency of discretionary assistance. 
 
5. Moral hazard is when in receipt of assistance the firm behaves in a way that varies the terms of 
the assistance contract, eg. by implementing the without-subsidy project, so that the assistance 
acts as a lump sum subsidy.  Murshed (1994) gives an analysis of assistance in this case.  
Under moral hazard, discretion may be used to test the firm’s commitment to implement the 
project as contracted.  This was the case for Regional Selective Assistance when introduced in 
the early 1970s.  Discretion was exercised over the number of project jobs, the firm viability 
and the public sector contribution.  In principle, each of these can be observed ex-post to the 
contract, but there was no ‘claw-back’ condition in the event of the firm failing to meet its 
obligations, so that discretion was to test the firm’s commitment to fully implementing the 
project.   A ‘proof of need’ condition was introduced in the early 1980s. 
 
6. These could be improved technology, R&D, increased exports or other positive externalities to 
the national economy, so that the model is broader than just employment creation, and applies 
to investment grant schemes more generally. 
 
7. This assumption is not strictly necessary and it is made to simplify the analysis.  It differs from 
Wren (2002a), where it is assumed that γ > λ, but with no real implications for the analysis. 
 
8. One possibility is that the firms have different access to private funds and that this acts as a 
signal to the government of a firm’s willingness to invest, but this is outside the paper’s scope.  
 
9. A firm’s bargaining power may increase with the investment scale or decrease with the number 
of projects.  The first of these is the same for all projects, while the latter does not explain 
differences in bargaining power between firms. The firm productivity might account for these 
differences, as high-productivity firms require a smaller grant and make a greater contribution 
to welfare, but this is outside the paper’s scope. 
 
10. The model has been worked through for the case where the maximum grant rate is announced, 
in which case the number of scrutinised projects is {α - r (1 - gs)} m.  Letting C denote the 
scrutiny costs then the grant rate for the ‘Proof of Need’ scheme is given by gs = {P γ - (1 - P) 
η - C} / (λ + η) P.  A positive grant rate exists only if C > γ, so that the cost of scrutinising each 
project cannot exceed its social value.  However, it means that the benefit function WSB in (22) 
depends on C, while the total scrutiny costs are {α - r (1 - gs)} m I C, so that WSC depends on gs. 
It greatly complicates the analysis, so that it is necessary to simplify by assuming that the grant 
rate is not announced.  This is in the government’s interest when there is bargaining 
 
11. Substituting for P ≡ {r + p (α - r)} / α, the condition P > η / (η + γ) becomes p > {η - r γ / (α - 
r)} / (η + γ).  It always holds when η < r γ / (α - r), which is when γ > χ, and it is an issue 
which is returned to below. 
 
12. The inequality φ ≤ ϕ can be shown to hold, as can the other inequality ψ < φ in Proposition 6. 
 
13. There are other ways to model the government’s behaviour in this case, but this is the easiest to 
work with.  One alternative, like before, is to assume that in the absence of scrutiny the 
government randomly assigns the available contracts across firms.  However, this means that 
the null contract is allocated with a probability of 1 - gmt r / α, where gmt is the maximum grant 
rate, while the rest of the time it allocates grant rates of between zero and gmt with an equal 
probability.  In this case, investment by the additional projects is m I (gmt r / α) (gmt r / 2), 
where gmt r / α is the probability that a contract is offered and gmt r / 2 is the overall probability 
that a firm makes a profit and takes up a contract.  This greatly complicates the analysis as 
investment now depends on gmt2, while it can be shown that total profits depend on gmt4, so that 
the optimal grant rate is determined by a cubic equation in gmt. 
 
14. Although not strictly necessary, the welfare expression is derived by supposing that ε ≤ (α - r) / 
r, so that not all of the non-additional projects are offered a non-zero grant rate in error.  This 
has no real significance for the results that are derived. 
 
15. The Type I error means that r ε m additional projects do not undertake investment, but while 
these also do not receive assistance the Type II error means that there is an equal number of 
non-additional projects that do receive assistance.  On average, the net effect of this is η ε / 2. 
 
16. Since Q ≥ 1 / 2 and ε ≤ γ / (λ + η), it can be shown that gmt > gs in (21) and gmt > ga* in (18a). 
 
17. Since ε2 is small, the approximation is derived by setting ε2 to zero in the quadratic equation for 
ε.  This gives a critical value, ε = γ / 2 (η + λ), and since ε ≤ min {γ / (λ + η), (α - r) / r}, then it 
is supposed that γ / 2 (η + λ) < (α - r) / r, in which case the automatic scheme may or may not 
exist, as it requires γ - η (α - r) / r > 0. 
 
18. If C = C(e) is linear, then WSC is also linear in e, so that the only way that an interior solution 
for effort can be generated is if WSB is strictly concave in e.  By (23), ∂WSB / ∂e = r m I [(η + γ)2 
- (η  / P)2] / 2 (λ + η) ∂P / ∂e, where P > η / (η + γ).   Differentiating this, ∂2WSB / ∂e2 < 0 if and 
only if  - (∂2P / ∂e2) e / (∂P / ∂e)  >  {(∂P / ∂e) e / P} {2 η2 / (P2 (η + γ)2 - η2)}.  Since P ≡ {r + 
p (α - r)} / α, then - (∂2P / ∂e2) e / (∂P / ∂e) = - (∂2p / ∂e2) e / (∂p / ∂e). 
 
19. In the case of Proposition 5, for example, when the benefit function has a concave form there 
will exist a range for the average scrutiny cost over which scrutiny is not worthwhile. 
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Figure 1: ‘Additional’ and ‘Non-Additional’ Projects
 
Non-
Additional 
projects 
Additional projects
Target projects Non-Target 
projects 
r α gm 0 
Figure 2: Benefit and Cost Function for ‘Proof of Need’ Scheme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The figure shows the case γ > χ, so that r / α > η / (η + γ), and the WSC schedule 
cuts the P-axis to the right of the WSB schedule.  The optimum occurs at P = r / α where 
effort e is zero. 
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Figure 3: Benefit and Cost Function for ‘Minimum Necessary’ Scheme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The figure shows the case ε > ≈ γ / 2 (η + λ), so that the WTC schedule cuts the Q-
axis to the left of the WTB schedule.  The optimum occurs at Q = 1 where maximum effort 
e is expended. 
 
 
 
1 / 2 
WTB 
WTC
1
0 
Q 
WTB, WTC 
